: For sanctions to work, they must create enough political pressure on the leader's "winning coalition"—the essential group of supporters needed to stay in power.
The full study is available via SAGE Journals or ResearchGate . Journal of Conflict Resolution - Florida State University 2007. An Institutional Theory of Sanctions Onse...
Democracies are more frequent senders and tend to target those most vulnerable to economic pressure. : For sanctions to work, they must create
Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by sanctions to reward loyalists. Autocratic leaders benefit from the scarcity created by
: In democracies, leaders rely on a large coalition. Economic pain felt by the broader public directly threatens the leader's support base, making them more likely to concede.
The 2007 article "," published in the Journal of Conflict Resolution by David Lektzian and Mark Souva , argues that the effectiveness and initiation of economic sanctions depend heavily on the political institutions of the target state. Core Argument: The "Winning Coalition"